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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Notes
LIABILITY OF ACCOUNTANTS TO THIRD PARTIES
FOR NEGLIGENCE AND DECEIT
An attempt to extend further the asserted proposition that
one who negligently performs a contractual duty owed another
is liable for injuries resulting to a stranger to the contract
was frustrated recently by the New York Court of Appeals in
the case of Ultramares Corporation v. Touche.1 The Supreme
Court, basing its decision on the case of Glanzer v. Shepard,2
had held that a firm of accountants, who had negligently certi-
fied a balance sheet for an insolvent corporation, were liable to a
third party who had lent money to the corporation in reliance
upon the balance sheet. 3 The Court of Appeals, however, was
not willing to allow a verdict on the ground of negligence, but
held that liability could be predicated only on the ground of
deceit, inasmuch as there were entries in the accounts of so
suspicious a nature as to make representations based thereon in
the absencb of further investigation such gross negligence as is
equivalent to deceit upon those creditors who relied upon the
statement in making advances. It therefore reversed the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court.
The case is interesting and important from two angles, the
judicial treatment by the Court speaking through Chief Judge
Cardozo, and the effect of the decision upon a profession, fast
growing in importance. 5
A further consideration of the facts in the instant case shows
that the defendants, Touche, Niven and Company, a firm of pub-
lic accountants, were employed by Fred Stern and Company to
prepare and certify a balance sheet exhibiting the condition of
its business in December 31, 1923. They had been employed at
the end of each of three years preceding to render a like service.
Knowing that such a statement would be exhibited to banks,
creditors, stockholders, purchasers and sellers, they made up
and supplied the Stern Company with thirty-two copies certified
with serial numbers as counterpart originals. The certificate
was as follows: "We have examined the accounts of the Fred
1 (1931) 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441.
2 (1922) 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275.
3 Ultramares Corp v. Touche (1930) 229 App. Div. 581, 243 N. Y. S. 179.
4 Green, The Judicial Pr'ocess-Ultramares Corp. v. Touche (1931) 26
ILL. L. REV. 49.
5 Lay, Business Policy as Related to Accounting (1929) 4 Acc. Rsv. 121;
Davies, The Changing Objectives of Accounting (1929) 4 Acc. REV. 94, 106.
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Stern and Co., Inc., for the year ending December 31, 1923, and
hereby certify that the annexed balance sheet is in accordance
therewith and with the information and explanation given us.
We further certify that, subject to provision for federal taxes
on income, the said statement, in our opinion, presents a true
and correct view of the financial condition of Fred Stern and
Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923."6
The plaintiff, a corporation engaged in business as a factor,
was approached by Stern in March, 1924, with a request for
loans of money to finance the sales of rubber. Since the previ-
ous dealings between the two houses had been slight, the plaintiff
requested a balance sheet certified by public accountants. One
of the thirty-two certified by the defendant was given by the
Stern Company to the plaintiff, and in reliance thereon, the lat-
ter extended the Stern Company a large line of credit, which
amounted to the sum of $165,000 in the month of December
alone. In January, 1925, the Stern Company was declared
bankrupt.
The balance sheet had shown a net worth of $1,070,715.26,
while, as a matter of fact, the Stern Company was insolvent at
the time. The assets included many spurious items, especially
a suspicious entry of about $700,000, which were not verified by
the defendant's accountant.
The New York Supreme Court dealt with the case rather
superficially in allowing a verdict on the negligence count and
not on the deceit count. It brought the above facts within the
general dictum of Glanzer v. Shepard, saying that "here is an act
performed carelessly, intended to influence the actions of third
parties, and one that reasonably might be expected, when care-
lessly performed, to cause substantial loss." 7
In Glanzer v. Shepard, a seller of beans requested the defend-
ants, public weighers, to make return of the weight and furnish
the buyer with a copy. This the defendants did. Their return,
which was one made out in duplicate, one copy to the seller and
the other to the buyer, recited that it was made by order of the
former for the use of the latter. The buyer paid the seller on
faith of the certificate which turned out to be erroneous. The
weighers were held liable at the suit of the buyer for moneys
overpaid. The opinion in that case was also rendered by Chief
Judge Cardozo. In distinguishing that case from the instant
case, he said: "Here [Glanzer case] was something more than
the rendition of a service in the expectation that the one who
ordered the certificate would use it thereafter in the operations
of his business as occasion would require. Here was a case
6 N. 1 above, 442.
7 N. 3 above, 184.
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where the transmission of the certificate to another was not
merely one possibility among many, but the 'end and aim of the
transaction' . . ."8
Hence, it was conceded in the present case that the account-
ants were negligent, that is, there was a violation of duty, if any
duty to be careful existed, and that there was the damage and
causal relation. That a duty existed, however, in the same
sense that one was recognized in Glanzer v. Shepard was denied.
Reasons for holding thus were found in both business and ad-
ministrative policies. 9
From the business standpoint:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or
blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the
cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to inkindle
doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a
duty that exposes to these consequences. 10
The necessity for a limit somewhere is recognized. Yet it
would seem that in the case of a profession in which special skill
is an inherent characteristic and which fact is recognized by
statutes in the various states, licensing certified public account-
ants, such a limit should be extended to include that class-re-
gardless of size-which might reasonably be expected to rely on
the professional statements. The fact that the class is large,
and hence the extent of injury vast, are reasons for recognizing
such a further duty, rather than for limiting the scope of liabil-
ity, because of the admittedly widespread danger.
From the administrative standpoint:
The extension, if made, will so expand the field of liability
for negligent speech as to make it nearly, if not quite coter-
minous with that of liability for fraud. . . We have said
that the duty to refrain from negligent misrepresentation
would become coincident or nearly so with the duty to re-
frain from fraud if this action could be maintained. 1
It is true that there is a need for securing the integrity of
both networks of the deceit and negligence theories so as not to
render the handling of cases difficult by confusing many points
of conflicting formulae. 12 But it should not be deduced as a nec-
essary consequence that parties in the same class such as ac-
8 N. 1 above, 445. 11 Ibid. 447.
9 Op. cit. n. 4 above, 50, 51. 12 Op. cit. n. 4 above, 51.
ON. 1 above, 444.
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countants, may not fall into either one of the two classes, depend-
ing upon the particular circumstances. The need for distinct
separation of the two legal theories does not require nor justify
the labeling of all accountants in such an exclusive manner that,
in relation to third parties who rely upon certified statements
prepared by them for debtors, only the deceit theory may oper-
ate and not the other.13
In distinguishing the negligence theory in reference to liabil-
ity to third parties, Judge Cardozo points out:
the duty to speak with care does not arise unless the
words are the culmination of a service . . . and unless
the service is rendered in the pursuit of an independent call-
ing, characterized as public. . . Public accountants are
public only in the sense that their services are offered to any
one who chooses to employ them. This is far from saying
that those who do not employ thern are in the same position
as those who do. 14
In the Glanzer case the words were the culmination of the
service. The statement of weight and nothing more was to be
the final outcome of the whole transaction. That statement was
intended to be and actually was a basis for the transaction be-
tween the buyer and seller. In International Products Co. v.
Erie R. R. Co.,15 the defendant carrier, which was bailee of
plaintiff's goods, upon the request of the plaintiff, named the
place where the goods were stored, but did so incorrectly. The
consequence was that an insurance policy which plaintiff had
procured upon the goods did not attach. The goods were de-
stroyed by fire. The defendant was held liable. In that case, it was
said that there was such a relationship between the parties, so
that a duty existed "if one speaks at all, to give the correct in-
formation."16 The giving of the information by the Erie was
not the basic service, but was rather incidental. Chief Judge
Cardozo reconciles this latter fact to the above rule wherein the
words are necessarily the culmination of a service, by pointing
out that the Erie was not held for negligence in the rendition of
a service, but "it was held for words and nothing more."'17 As a
matter of good business practice, the decision is creditable, since
the risk should fall on him who has the information at hand and
upon whose word reliance is placed.
Furthermore, the certification by a trustee that assets are in
Is N. 1 above, 447-8.
14 Ibid. 448.
125 (1927) 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 662.
18 Ibid. 664.
17 N. 1 above, 446.
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his possession allows no latitude.18 When his certificate induces
another to become a beneficiary of the trust, he must certify
truly or become responsible to those who invest their moneys
upon the faith of his certificate. Honesty of purpose is no
excuse.' 9
It is therefore indicated that the incidental use by the plain-
tiffs of the balance sheet certified by the defendants in the pres-
ent case was not such a culmination of the service as to create a
duty between the parties sufficient to render defendants liable
for carelessness. The bringing of accountancy within the class
of "public calling" so that such a duty would arise, furthermore,
would be such an extension that in many analogous situations,
the liability for negligent speech would become nearly, if not
quite, coterminous with fraud. For instance, lawyers who cer-
tify their opinions as to the validity of municipal or corporate
bonds, title companies insuring titles to land, newspapers re-
porting market quotations, 20 and other such unlimited number
of examples, would be kept with difficulty from the operation of
the extended doctrine.
There is some precedent for the proposition that, as between a
party to a contract to perform a service and a third party
stranger, a sufficiently direct relationship may be deemed to ex-
ist as will give rise to a duty not to be negligent. Those en-
gaged in "common callings," such as the practice of medicine,
have been brought within the scope of such liability.2l There
has been a split of authority on the question of liability when the
contract involves a supposed public duty in addition to the con-
tractual duty, as in cases where a property owner attempts to
hold one who has contracted with a municipality to supply it
with water for fire protection and such contract has been
breached.2 2  The majority of the courts hold, however, that
there is no liability.
18 Doyle v. Chatam & Phenix Nat. Bank (1930) 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E.
574.
29 Op. cit. n. 4 above, 52.
20 See Jaillet v. Cashman (1923) 235 N. Y. 511, 139 N. E. 714. In that
case the defendant supplying ticker service to brokers was held not liable in
damages to one of the broker's customers for the consequences of reliance
upon a report negligently published on the ticker.
21 Pippin and Wife v. Sheppard (1822) 11 Price 400, 147 Eng. Repr. 512.
See Bohlen, Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts (1905) 53 Am. L.
REG. 209, 219.
22 Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. (1928) 247 N. Y. 160, 159 N. E. 896;
German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Home Water Co. (1912) 226 U. S. 220,
33 Sup. Ct. 32. Contra, Woodbury v. Trampa Water Works Co. (1909) 57
Fla. 243, 49 So. 556 (minority view). See comprehensive note in (1928)
62 A. L. R. 1199, 1205.
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Under the "dangerous instrumentality" doctrine, manufac-
turers, contractors and vendors have been held liable where
their negligence has resulted in injuries to life or limb.23 The
liability of telegraph companies in this country to the recipients
of messages negligently transmitted has been long settled.24
Some jurisdictions hold a title abstractor liable to third parties
expected to rely on the certificate,25 while others make him
liable by statute.26
On the fraud doctrine, the court in the instant case finds little
difficulty in showing that there were sufficient grounds to infer
deceit. It said:
Fraud includes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge
there is none. To creditors and investors to whom the em-
ployer exhibited the certificate, the defendants owed a . . .
duty to make it without fraud, since there was notice in the
circumstances of its making that the employer did not in-
tend to keep it to himself .27 The defendants certified
as a fact, true to their own knowledge, that the balance
sheet was in accordance with the books of account. If their
statement was false, they are not to be exonerated because
they believed it to be true. .. 28 The plaintiff does not
need the invention of a novel doctrine to help it out in such
conditions. 29
This conclusion on the basis of fraud has but one disturbing
element in it. It is denied that there is a sufficient relationship
between the plaintiffs and accountants in the present case to
permit reliance on the balance sheet so as to predicate liability
for negligence. Nevertheless, it is asserted that there is such a
relationship between the defendant and plaintiff for purposes of
imposing liability for fraud. The Court speaks of a duty
"to creditors and investors to whom the employer exhibited
the certificate." It is settled that only those whose actions were
intended to be influenced have a right to accept and rely upon the
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1919) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050;
American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF TORTS, 262. For compre-
hensive discussion see, Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other
Than Their Immediate Vendees (1929) 45 L. Q. Ruv. 343.
24 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Dubois (1889) 128 Ill. 248, 21 N. E. 4.
English rule is contra. But see Pollock, LAW OF TORTS (11th ed. 1920) 560.
25 Anderson v. Spriesterbach (1912) 69 Wash. 393, 125 Pac. 166. Com-
pare a recent case, Cole v. Vincent (1930) 242 N. Y. S. 644, where knowl-
edge in the abstractor of the third person's identity was held immaterial.
26 (1930) 40 YAm L. J. 128, n. 14. See note (1925) 34 A. L. R. 67, 73.
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representation of others. 30 In fact, one may even be the person
to whom the false representations are made, and yet be en-
titled to no remedy, if they were made to him as agent for an-
other and to affect the action of the other, and were not intended
to influence his own action. 3 1
Where one person, however, makes a false representation to
another for the purpose of being communicated to a third party,
then there will be liability to the latter for fraud.82 Upon this
principle, therefore, where fraudulent statements are made to
mercantile agencies by persons regarding the status of their
business, they are held liable to all parties relying upon such
statements. 33 Also in cases where projectors of corporate un-
dertakings publish prospectuses containing misrepresentations
calculated to influence others to invest moneys in their projects,
liability for fraud to third parties has been sustained.3 4 It is
within such a class of third persons that the Ultramwres case at-
tempts to bring creditors who rely upon balance sheets fraudu-
lently prepared for employers by public accountants.
It is not suggested that the public is not within a sufficiently
close relationship in the case of creditors relying upon state-
ments given to mercantile agencies, or in the case of persons
relying upon false prospectuses, to show fraud on the part of
those issuing such statements to themselves. It is suggested,
however, that the public, among whom are creditors, are not in
a position so analogous to the third parties above, that a suf-
ficient privity as to public accountants certifying balance sheets
for employers to whom said public has extended credit in reli-
ance thereon may be deemed to exist for purposes of fraud. This
suggestion is made in light of facts pointed out by Judge
Cardozo in dismissing the negligence theory, wherein he states
that "the service was primarily for the benefit of the Stern
Company, a convenient instrumentality for use in the develop-
ment of the business, and only incidentally or collaterally for the
use of those to whom Stern and his associates might exhibit
thereafter."35
8 0 Throckmorton's, COOLEY ON TORTs (1930) 601; Henry v. Dennis (1902)
92 Me. 24, 219 Atl. 58/, Hindman v. First Nat. Bank (C. C. A. 8, 1902) 112
F. 931.
S1 Wells v. Cook (1865) 160 Ohio St. 67; McCracken v. West (1848) 17
Ohio 16.32 Waston v. Crandall (1883) 78 Mo. 583; Baker v. Crandall (1883) 78
Mo. 584; Commonwealth v. Call (Mass. 1839) 21 Pick. 515, 523.38 Eaton, Cole & Burnham Co. v. Avery (1880) 83 N. Y. 31; Tindle v.
Birkett (1902) 171 N. Y. 520, 64 N. E. 210.
' Op. cit. n. 30 above, 602; Paddock v. Fletcher (1869) 42 Vt. 389; Ter-
willinger v. Grt. West. Tel. Co. (1871) 59 Ill. 249. See also Derry v. Peek
(1889) 14 A. C. 337.
86 1 above, 446.
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Prospectuses and statements to mercantile agencies, on the
other hand, are made with the sole intention of obtaining credit
or investment. The basis of the distinction laid down with
reference to the negligence theory between the Ultramares case
and the Glanzer case was that in the latter case, the statement of
weight for use by both buyer and seller was said to be the "end
and aim of the transaction."3 6  Consistency demands that a
similar distinction be made in dealing with the fraud theory in
the Ultramares case.
Judge Cardozo, however, disposes of this "logic" by pointing
out that "foresight of these possibilities [incidental use of certi-
fied balance sheet by creditors] may charge with liability for
fraud," but "The conclusion does not follow that it will charge
with liability for negligence. ' 37 This explanation seems some-
what inadequate. The logical inconsistencies in reconciling and
distinguishing relationships or privities necessary to maintain
an action for negligence on the one hand and an action for deceit
on the other leave one seeking an understanding of the law with
a feeling of dissatisfaction. 38
The decision in the Ultramcres case has, apart from this dis-
concerting effect upon legal theories, redeeming features from
the practical standpoint of the judicial process. Professor Green
remarks:
The fraud formula as a moral solvent is at the same time
consistent with good business and easy administration.
Under it the judge may exercise a maximum of power.
The accountant is not placed under less responsibility, but
more. If he unqualifiedly certifies to facts which are not
true, he is not merely under a duty to be diligent, but he is
under a duty to be correct.
The latitude allowed by permitting the jury to infer fraud
from negligence leaves all to the jury and gives every ad-
sd Ibid. 445.
3 Ibid. 446.
38 See Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1928) 28. "I own
that it is a good deal of mystery to me how judges, of all persons in the
world, should put their faith in dicta. A brief experience on the bench was
enough to reveal to me all sorts of cracks and crevices and loopholes in my
own opinions when picked up a few months after delivery and reread with
contrition." Later the author says, "The directive force of logic does not
always exert itself, however, along a single and unobstructed path. One
principle or precedent, pushed to the limit of its logic, may point to one
conclusion; another principle or precedent, followed with like logic, may
point with equal certainty to another. In this conflict, we must choose be-
tween the two paths, selecting one or other, or perhaps striking out upon a
third which will be the resultant of the two forces in combination, or will
represent the mean between two extremes." Ibid. 40.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol17/iss3/8
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vantage afforded by the negligence formula. In addition,
in its psychological effects the fraud formula is more sober-
ing upon the jury than a formula requiring less moral
culpability. . . In these cases, therefore, the fraud for-
mula, permitting at one moment the most decisive use of
judicial power, at another the wide variation of law ver-
dicts, serves the purpose of consistent administration far
better than the negligence formula which allows the judge
the minimum and the jury the maximum of power in nearly
all cases.3 9
There is some general truth in Professor Green's conclusion,
although there is room for question in regard to the statement
that more responsibility is placed upon the accountant by the
fraud theory alone in the Ultramares case. It is not suggested
that the fraud theory be abandoned in the least, but rather that it
should not preclude the negligence theory. Cases are conceiv-
able wherein accountants may be found to be negligent to third
parties and yet not fraudulent.40
Conceding that the certification of a balance sheet for credit
purposes is not its only use, yet there is much evidence in every-
day business practice that such use is recognized as one of the
most important if not the most important use.41 It is true that
the creditor can find other means of protecting his interests
without reliance upon the debtor's balance sheet prepared by the
debtor's own accountant. 42 But the fact remains that he does
not seek such other means for practical reasons, and of this fact
the accountant must be aware. Moreover, the increasing com-
plexity of business and of methods of handling business will in-
crease the need for atthoritative data and accurate statements 48
so that eventually the scope of relationship sufficient to show lia-
bility of a public accountant to third parties will of necessity be
drawn closer to include negligence. 44
H. ROBERT SHAMPAINE, '32.
89 Op. cit. n. 4 above, 55.
40 See lower court decision in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, n. 3 above. Al-
so the appellate court decision, n. 1 above, 448.
41 Eggleston, AUDITING PROCEDURE (1926) 15.42 Op. cit. n. 4 above, 55.
43 Baldwin, Liability of Accountants to Third Parties (1931) 52 J. O
Acc. 342 (dealing with Ultramares case).44 See further (1919) 29 YALE L. J. 234, commenting on Landell v. Ly-
brand (1919) 264 Pa. 406, 107 Atl. 783, which held in accord with Ultra-
mares case that a certified public accountant is not liable to purchasers of
stock who relied upon balance sheet negligently prepared for insolvent cor-
poration. The comment criticizes the decision in the case.
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